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key messages
 International trade law and human rights share a common origin as mutually
supportive bodies of law to protect individual freedom. Yet, to a large extent they
developed in isolation from each other. As a result, the two regimes are now part
of the fragmented landscape of international law. On the one hand, human rights
protect individual rights that are essential for international trade, such as rights
to freely pursue economic activities or freedom of expression. On the other hand,
trade rules may jeopardise the realisation of human rights, especially social rights.
 In order to avoid negative impacts of this fragmentation, mechanisms for solving
conflicts between the two regimes are necessary. We argue that such mechanisms
require neither a rigid concept of hierarchy of norms nor new substantive obli-
gations to be imposed on states. Instead, we call for appropriate procedures and
coordination. This general procedural approach is illustrated for specific human
rights and their relation to international trade law.
A. Introduction
At first glance, human rights1 and trade regimes do not have much in com-
mon. Human rights’ primary focus on ensuring human dignity for each
individual is absent from trade’s commitment to ensuring that nations
can flourish economically. Separate in their legal development in the
∗ Individual Project No. 4, ‘Human Rights and Trade’.
1 The term ‘human rights’ in this document refers to existing human rights norms as
enshrined in core international human rights treaties.
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twentieth century,2 human rights and trade regimes are, however, as off-
spring of an international post-world war order, both instruments of
the same overall global interest, which is to promote peace and human
welfare. As different sides of the same coin, they are mutually complemen-
tary. The objective of the World Trade Organization (WTO) of increasing
human welfare with an open trading system that fosters employment
and development at the same time requires and promotes individual
freedom and human rights.3 Human rights serve trade interests because
they enhance economic potential (e.g. human resources and education)
and protect economic freedoms. Defining procedures and parameters to
strike a careful balance when, in a fragmented international order, sys-
temic overlaps occur, is thus crucial to assure the effectiveness of both
regimes. In addition, the sustainable development provision as anchored
in the preamble of the WTO Marrakesh Agreement requires balancing
WTO economic objectives against social and environmental concerns.4
As human rights standards form part of the social factor of the concept5
the task of efficiently coordinating human rights and WTO law is im-
plicitly expressed in the sustainability objective to which WTO Members
have committed.
However, after almost fifteen years of existence of the WTO, this man-
date has still not been fulfilled. WTO bodies have not reacted to the
human rights approach to trade proposed by the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights. The Doha Agenda does not refer to human
rights.6 New initiatives for coordinating international trade law and
human rights seem unlikely in the near future.7 Hence, WTO policy
is not only committed to coordinate both systems, but is also under
2 T. Cottier, ‘Trade and human rights, a relationship to discover’ (2002) 5 Journal of Inter-
national Economic Law 111.
3 T. Cottier, ‘Legitimacy of the WTO law’ (2008) NCCR Working Paper 2008/19, 6; S. A.
Aaronson, ‘Seeping in slowly: How human rights concerns are penetrating the WTO’
(2007) 6 World Trade Review 413.
4 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 129, at footnote 107; International Law Associa-
tion, Report of the 70th Conference, New Delhi, Committee on Legal Aspects of Sustainable
Development (Cambrian Printers, 2002), pp. 385–398.
5 K. Gehne, ‘Nachhaltige Entwicklung als Rechtsprinzip: normativer Aussagegehalt, rechts-
theoretische Einordnung, Funktionen im Recht’, PhD thesis, University of Zu¨rich (2008).
6 R. Howse and R. G. Teitel, ‘Beyond the divide: The Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the World Trade Organization’ (2007) 30 Dialogue on Globaliza-
tion, available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04572.pdf (visited 14 April 2009),
p. 5.
7 International Law Association, ‘Report of the 73rd Conference’, Rio de Janeiro, (2008),
Committee on International Trade Law, para. 39.
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pressure to react. No legal system will operate effectively if the solution
of potential conflicts of norms is left to legal uncertainty and the related
legitimacy concerns are being ignored. Neither the human rights nor the
trade regime can function effectively if they are not promoted in such
a way as to mutually assure their objectives. If the WTO remains silent
on overlapping trade and human rights issues, it loses credibility which
may jeopardise its status as a key actor in international governance.8
Legal instruments to coordinate both regimes, as proposed in this chap-
ter, could contribute significantly to a more coherent and predictable
legal structure, improve international decision making and sustain the
Organization’s legitimacy. The goal is not to establish a hierarchy of
one regime over the other based on ideological concepts or to freeze
legal options into a fixed system of rules. Rather, we aim at an on-
going process of creating flexible legal and institutional mechanisms
which allow the careful balancing and coherent development of both
systems on a case-by-case basis. The systemic necessity for coherently
interpreting trade and human rights rules has already been acknowledged
by the International Law Association Trade Law Committee in its 2008
Report which submitted a Draft ILA Declaration on International Trade
Law and Human Rights.9 This chapter will go beyond this approach by
suggesting a general framework as well as recommendations for specific
human rights.
In the following we are advocating a Multilateral Agreement on Trade
and Human Rights to be annexed to the WTO Marrakesh Agreement.
With a view to creating such a commitment and launching the necessary
political process, we propose a WTO Ministerial Decision to prepare the
agreement. In this vein, we first present an annotated Draft Decision on
Trade and Human Rights (B). Second, based on our research, we set out
elements of a Multilateral Agreement on Trade and Human Rights (C).
Third, we elaborate on regulatory initiatives in specific areas which could
be considered as annexes to the Multilateral Trade and Human Rights
Agreement or other WTO agreements (D).
8 E.-U. Petersmann, ‘The “Human Rights Approach” advocated by the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization: Is it relevant for
WTO law and policy?’ (2004) 7 Journal of International Economic Law 611; J. Pauwelyn,
‘The Sutherland Report: A missed opportunity for genuine debate on trade, globalization
and reforming the WTO’ (2005) 8 Journal of International Economic Law 331.
9 International Law Association, Report of the 73rd Conference, Rio de Janeiro (2008),
Committee on International Trade Law, available at www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.
cfm/cid/24 (visited 14 April 2009), para. 35.
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 130.60.248.196 on Thu Jul 10 10:48:38 BST 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511792496.010
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014
326 barnali choudhury et al.
B. Creating the commitment: a decision on trade and human
rights as a starting point and normative guideline
The following draft Decision on Trade and Human Rights together with
short comments transmits some of our key research findings and their
potential policy implications. It is intended as a commitment for coordi-
nating trade law and human rights by the Ministerial Conference which
can take decisions on all matters under any of the multilateral trade
agreements.10
box 8.1 draft decision on trade and human rights
DECISION ON TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Ministers,
 Recognising that human rights concerns are inextricably linked to free trade;
 Reaffirming our commitment to respect, protect and promote the dignity of all
humans;
 Acknowledging our legal obligations under international human rights law;
 Convinced that trade liberalisation can foster the practical advancement of human
rights;
 Concerned that international trade’s impact on some individuals has lessened
rather than increased their enjoyment of basic human rights and that trade rules
may form a hindrance to the progressive development of human rights law;
 Aware that private actors can significantly affect dignified conditions for work
and life and reaffirming the duty of the State to protect all human rights from
abuses by, or involving, business enterprises;
 Accepting the United Nation’s human rights approach to trade, that ‘seeks to
devise trade law and policy to take into account the rights of all individuals, in
particular vulnerable individuals and groups’ and ‘requires a constant examina-
tion of the impact of trade liberalisation on the enjoyment of human rights’;
 Noticing the Singapore Declaration’s ‘commitment to the observation of inter-
nationally recognised core labour standards’ as well as the statement in the Dec-
laration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization of the International Labour
Organization that the ‘violation of fundamental principles and rights at work
cannot be invoked or otherwise used as a legitimate comparative advantage’;
10 We deliberately opt for the political and not the judicial body to decide on trade and
human rights issues. This is not only in line with the general character of the WTO as a
member-driven organisation but also ensures participation and public discussion of this
controversial field of law. See, e.g., M. A. Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of
Political Discourse (New York, The Free Press, 1993), pp. 171, 182.
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 130.60.248.196 on Thu Jul 10 10:48:38 BST 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511792496.010
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014
trade and human rights 327
 Noting that carefully drafted trade incentive regimes may advance the cause of
human rights
Decide,
 that the World Trade Organization shall fully respect the international law of
human rights and support their full enjoyment;
 that the protection of human dignity shall be a guiding principle of the
Organization;
 that a Multilateral Agreement on Trade and Human Rights is to be negotiated,
providing appropriate instruments to foster mutually supportive regimes and
institutional and legal coherence to promote the full effectiveness of both regimes.
I. . . . Recognising that human rights concerns are inextricably linked
to free trade and convinced that trade liberalisation can foster the
advancement of human rights
As mentioned above, human rights and international trade law are inter-
dependent legal regimes. Trade policy and rules can positively influence
employment, competitive advantage, and living conditions, but can also –
if competition is detrimental or production toxic – destroy income sources
and livelihoods and thus compromise human rights, such as the rights
to food, to health, to work or to be free from discrimination.11 Likewise,
free markets depend on human rights; such as access to information,
free movement, economic freedom, and judicial rights. As a result, a free
trade regime can foster human rights at the same time as human rights
are fostering trade.12 This is conceptually expressed in a constitutionalist
approach to the WTO, according to which human rights form part of a
constitutional horizontal layer of law which serves as a guiding principle
for law creation and law application.13
11 See, e.g. ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’, Report of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted in accordance with the Commission
on Human Rights Resolution 2001/32. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/54 (15 January 2002).
12 E.-U. Petersmann, ‘The “Human Rights Approach” advocated by the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization: Is it relevant for
WTO Law and Policy?’ (2004) 7 Journal of International Economic Law 613; International
Law Association, ‘Report of 73rd Conference’, Rio de Janeiro (2008), Committee on Inter-
national Trade Law, para. 42.; R. Howse and R. G. Teitel, ‘Beyond the divide: The Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the World Trade Organization’ (2007) 30
Dialogue onGlobalization, available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04572.pdf
(visited 14 April 2009).
13 See the contribution of the Individual Project No. 1 to this book, ‘Constitutionalism and
Multilayered Governance’.
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 130.60.248.196 on Thu Jul 10 10:48:38 BST 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511792496.010
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014
328 barnali choudhury et al.
II. . . . Reaffirming our commitment to respect, protect and promote
the dignity of all humans
The concept of human dignity constitutes the root of all human rights.
Since human rights also form part of the sustainability objective of the
WTO,14 human dignity belongs to the ‘basic principles’ and ‘objectives
underlying this multilateral trading system’, which WTO Members are
committed to ‘preserve’ and ‘foster’.15 In order to raise the awareness of
Members and WTO arbitrators this Declaration emphasises and reaffirms
human dignity as a key conceptual element in coordinating the human
rights and trade regime.
III. . . . Acknowledging our legal obligations under international
human rights law
Besides their trade treaty obligations, WTO Members are bound by
human rights law. All 192 UN Member States have human rights obliga-
tions under the UN Charter.16 Each WTO Member has ratified at least one
of the eight core international human rights treaties.17 In addition, parts
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) have become
customary international law.18 States cannot refrain from meeting their
human rights obligations by adhering to other legal regimes with lower
standards of human rights protection.19
IV. . . . Concerned that international trade’s impact on some
individuals has lessened rather than increased their enjoyment of basic
human rights and that trade rules may form a hindrance to the full
enjoyment of human rights and progressive development
of human rights law
Studies on the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, on trade and investment, and the
14 See above, Introduction.
15 Preamble of the WTO Marrakesh Agreement, para. 5.
16 See Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter.
17 See for the core agreements: www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm#core (visited 8
December 2008), for ratification statistics www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/
(visited 14 April 2009).
18 See P. Alston, ‘Ships passing in the night: The current state of the human rights and
development debate seen through the lens of the Millennium Development Goals’ (2007)
27 Human Rights Quarterly 754–828.
19 See European Court of Human Rights,Matthews v. theUnitedKingdom, case No. 24833/94,
§ 28, ECHR 1999-I.
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principle of non-discrimination show that international trade has the
potential for compromising human rights.20 Such potential negative
impacts became apparent and were confirmed during our project through
doctoral research exploring the impact of international trade law on the
right to food and public services:
1. Example: The right to food
Several studies which have examined the impact of trade liberalisation on
the right to food found violations of this right21 by a government vis-a`-
vis its people. Such violations occur, for example, through not stabilising
farm gate prices at an adequate level, not sufficiently targeting support
to poor farmers and not reacting to dumping.22 The studies assessed
the impact of trade liberalisation on the right to food by combining
macro-level analysis of domestic food production, foreign importation
and related state policies with micro-analysis at the community level. The
main challenge of such studies is the verification of causalities between
trade policies and the violation of the right to food. The effects of natural
disasters, civil wars, changes in land tenure arrangements, deterioration
in access to infrastructure, farm input, credits or extension services are
additional factors that need to be carefully assessed.23
The 2008 food crisis illustrates that international trade significantly
influences the food situation. A panel organised with scholars from the
NCCR Trade Regulation research group on agriculture (IP5) found that
from a food security perspective, export restrictions and regulation of
biofuels need to be addressed in the Doha Round.24
20 C. Breining-Kaufmann, ‘The legal matrix of human rights and trade law: State obligations
versus private rights and obligations’, in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn and E. Bu¨rgi (eds.), Human
Rights and International Trade (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 118; C. Dommen,
‘Human rights and trade: Two practical suggestions for promoting coordination and
coherence’, in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn and E. Bu¨rgi (eds.), Human Rights and International
Trade (Oxford University Press 2005), p. 200.
21 The right to food is enshrined in Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. For an overview of the different state obligations to respect,
protect and fulfil the right to food, see C. Kaufmann and S. Heri, ‘Liberalizing trade
in agriculture and food security: Mission impossible?’ (2008) 40 Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law 1039-1070, 1051–55.
22 For an example see A. Paasch, F. Garbers and T. Hirsch, Trade Policies and Hunger: The
Impact of Trade Liberalisation on the Right to Food of Rice Farming Communities in Ghana,
Honduras and Indonesia (Geneva, Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance, 2007).
23 Ibid., p. 113.
24 World Trade Organization, 2008 Public Forum Proceedings (25–26 September), Session
16: ‘World Food Crisis: Are trade rules a problem or a way forward?’ Organised by NCCR
Trade Regulation, World Trade Institute and the International Centre for Trade and
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 130.60.248.196 on Thu Jul 10 10:48:38 BST 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511792496.010
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014
330 barnali choudhury et al.
During the Uruguay Round, negotiators were already concerned that
agricultural reform could have negative effects on least developed and net
food-importing developing countries, since several analyses had shown
that the reform process was likely to increase food import bills as world
prices of basic foodstuffs were expected to increase.25 The response was
the Marrakesh Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative
Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-
Importing Countries.26 The Marrakesh Decision included four response
mechanisms:
1. food aid;
2. short-term financing of normal levels of commercial imports;
3. favourable terms for agricultural export credits; and
4. technical and financial assistance to improve agricultural productivity
and infrastructure.27
Although it was an integral part of the negotiations on agricultural
trade liberalisation in the Uruguay Round,28 and despite its incorporation
in Article 16 of the Agreement on Agriculture, the Marrakesh Decision
has not been satisfactorily implemented. Since the main obligation to
respect, protect and fulfil the right to adequate food to the maximum of
available resources remains with the national governments, further efforts
to implement and update the Marrakesh Decision to buffer negative and
promote positive impacts are needed.
2. Example: Public services
Public services are of crucial importance to human life as they meet key
needs such as health, education and water.29 Their provision is often a
Sustainable Development. Report written by S. Heri and C. Ha¨berli (Geneva: WTO Pub-
lications, forthcoming); C. Kaufmann and M. Grosz, ‘Poverty, hunger and international
trade: What’s law got to do with it? Current mechanisms and the Doha Development
Agenda’ (2008) 51 German Yearbook of International Law 79–109.
25 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, The Right to Food Guidelines:
Information Papers and Case Studies (FAO, 2005), pp. 66–67.
26 World Trade Organization, Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative
Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Devel-
oping Countries (15 April 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Decisions adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee, 1867 UNTS 60
(1994).
27 Ibid., para. 3–5.
28 R. Howse and R. G. Teitel, ‘Beyond the Divide. The Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the World Trade Organization’ (2007) 30 Dialogue on Globalization,
26.
29 Report of the High Commissioner, UN Commission on Human Rights, Liberalization of
Trade in Services and Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 13 (25 June 2002).
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precondition for the realisation of human rights.30 Public services
are needed both economically and socially to propel growth and
development.31 From a human dignity perspective, they need to be pro-
vided on an equitable basis and regardless of an individual’s ability to
pay for them.32 Thus, problems with the provision of public services can
have particularly detrimental effects on human rights. In the context of
agreements facilitating investment, such as GATS, liberalisation of these
services may increase in the future.33 Experience shows that in some
instances, liberalisation has led to improved quality or gains in efficiency.
In other cases, however, the privatisation of water services has had a neg-
ative impact on the quality or quantity of the water provided, on the
cost of water services, and on access to water. As a result, the three core
entitlements of the human right to water have been infringed.34 Similar
effects have been reported for the right to education35 and the right to
health.36
Problems resulting from liberalising essential services have also led to
detrimental effects having a disproportionate impact on women’s human
rights. Due in part to the gendered nature of the economy or to the division
of labour in many countries, correcting the deficiencies in the provision
of essential services can become ‘women’s work’.37 Compromises in the
provision of water services can force women to become responsible for the
30 Human rights with regard to public services are, e.g., expressed through the right
to water, the right to education, or to health, enshrined in Articles 11, 12, 13
and 14 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see www2.ohchr.
org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm.
31 UNCTAD Secretariat, Universal Access to Services, Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat,
TD/B/COM.1/EM.30/2, 18 September 2006, para. 5.
32 Ibid.
33 See, e.g., M. Mashayekhi, M. Julsain and E. Tuerk, ‘Strategic considerations for developing
countries: The case of GATS and health services’, in C. Blouin, N. Drager and R. Smith,
(eds.) International Trade in Health Services and the GATS (World Bank, 2005), p. 21.
34 General Comment No. 15, The Right to Water (Articles 11 and 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2002/11 (26 November
2002), para. 12.
35 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, The Right to Education (Art. 13), General
comment No. 13, E/C.12/1999/10 (8 December 1999), para. 6.
36 See generally United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Substantive Issues Arising in the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 14 (2000), E/C.12/2000/4 (11/08/2000).
37 United Nations, ‘World survey on the role of women in development: Globalization,
gender and work’ (1999), 56–62; D. Joshi, ‘Misunderstanding gender in water’, in A. Coles
and T. Wallace (eds.), Gender, Water and Development (Oxford, Berg Publishers, 2005),
p. 138.
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gathering and collection of water from other sources.38 This, apart from
affecting their health, has caused a loss of women’s economic opportu-
nities and their ability to pursue education. Additionally, they may suffer
from problems with hygiene, due to deficiencies in services, or become
victims of sexual assault or harassment, e.g. on their way to and from the
places where they collect water.39
V. . . . Aware that private actors can significantly affect the conditions
necessary for fulfilling human dignity and reaffirming the duty of the
State to protect all human rights from abuses by, or involving, business
enterprises
Private actors are generally not directly bound by human rights because
they are not considered full subjects of international law.40 Efforts to
hold private actors responsible thus need to relate to the state’s horizontal
obligation to protect human rights. Yet, the activities of private actors
can have a significant impact on human rights, mainly if states do not
have at their disposal sufficient legal frameworks to protect human rights.
On the international level, the UN, ILO and OECD have adopted vari-
ous non-binding instruments regarding ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’,
such as the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the OECD Guidelines. The for-
mer UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights drafted the ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Cor-
porations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’
which extended human rights obligations to corporations. The document
was not adopted because of strong opposition by states and the business
community. It led, however, to the appointment of a Special Represen-
tative to the UN Secretary General on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises in July 2005.
Since then, a new approach has been developed, based on a bottom-up
process exploring attitudes of the business community to the issue. The
approach starts out from the horizontal duty of states to protect human
38 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2006 ‘Beyond
Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis’ (2006), p. 87.
39 Ibid.; V. Roaf, A. Khalfan and Malcolm Langford, ‘Monitoring implementation of the
right to water: A framework for developing indicators’ (2005) 14(1) Global Issues Papers
34.
40 See C. Breining-Kaufmann, ‘The legal matrix of human rights and trade law: State obliga-
tions versus private rights and obligations’, in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn and E. Bu¨rgi (eds.),
Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 99.
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rights from being violated by private actors. It defines a framework to be
implemented by states which requires companies to respect human rights
and calls for the development of effective remedy mechanisms. The next
step will be to further develop this framework into a viable and effec-
tive regime for international business and human rights.41 This approach
overcomes the conceptual deficit in general international law with regard
to private actors by defining a clear framework for states on how to comply
with their horizontal obligations under international human rights law.
The suggested draft decision follows this avenue and applies it to poten-
tial conflicts of international trade law and human rights in the business
context.
VI. . . . Accepting the United Nations’ human rights approach to
trade, that ‘seeks trade law and policy that take into account the rights
of all individuals, in particular vulnerable individuals and groups’ and
‘requires a constant examination of the impact of trade liberalization
on the enjoyment of human rights’
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights asks for policies which:
(a) Set the promotion and protection of human rights among the objec-
tives of trade liberalization;
(b) Examine the effects of trade liberalization on individuals and seek
trade law and policy that take into account the rights of all individuals,
in particular vulnerable individuals and groups;
(c) Emphasize the role of the State in the process of liberalization – not
only as negotiators of trade law and setters of trade policy, but also as
the primary duty bearer for the implementation of human rights;
(d) Seek consistency between the progressive liberalization of trade and
the progressive realization of human rights;
(e) Require a constant examination of the impact of trade liberalization
on the enjoyment of human rights;
(f) Promote international cooperation for the realization of human
rights and freedoms in the context of trade liberalization.42
41 See for all available material www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home
(visited 16 August 2009).
42 Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Liberalization of Trade in Ser-
vices and Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9; see also www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/
globalization/trade/index.htm (visited 14 April 2009).
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Against this background, policy evaluations are necessary to measure the
impact of trade policies on human rights and mutually supportive syner-
gies. Impact assessment methodologies are currently being developed by
international organisations (UNHCHR and UNEP) as well as by WTO
Members (EU) and academia,43 with human rights impact assessment
being mainly addressed within the UN framework.44
VII. . . . Noticing the Singapore Declaration’s ‘commitment to the
observation of internationally recognized core labour standards’ as well
as the statement in the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair
Globalization of the International Labour Organization that the
‘violation of fundamental principles and rights at work cannot be
invoked or otherwise used as a legitimate comparative advantage’
During the WTO Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in 1996,
states renewed their commitment to internationally recognised labour
standards.45 The ILO was defined as the competent body for addressing
and developing international labour standards.46 In 1998, the Interna-
tional Labour Conference adopted the today widely accepted ILO Declar-
ation on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work that all members of
the ILO are required to respect, promote and realise.47 These fundamen-
tal rights at work comprise the prohibition of forced labour and child
43 M. Gehring, Nachhaltigkeit durch Verfahren im Welthandelsrecht. Umwelt – und Nach-
haltigkeitspru¨fungen und die WTO (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2007); Communication
from the Commission on Impact Assessment, 5.6.2002, COM(2002)276; Communi-
cation from the Commission, A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European
Union Strategy for Sustainable Development, 15.5.2001, COM(2001)264; C. George and
C. H. Kirkpatrick, Impact Assessment and Sustainable Development: European Practice
and Experience (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2007); L. Turner, N. Nguyen and K. Bird,
Fighting Poverty, An Overview of Ex Ante Tools for Assessing the Impact of Trade Liberali-
sation on the Poor (Overseas Development Institute, 2008); for UNEP methodology see
www.unep.ch/etb/areas/IntTraRelPol.php (visited 14 April 2009).
44 S. Walker, ‘Human rights impact assessments of trade-related policies’, in M. W. Gehring
and M.-C. Cordonier Segger (eds.), Sustainable Development in World Trade Law (The
Hague, Kluwer, 2005), p. 227.
45 WTO, Singapore, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W, 13 December 1996,
para. 4.
46 Ibid.
47 Adopted by the International Labour Conference, 86th session, 18 June 1998, ILC, Record
of Proceedings, Nos. 20 and 22 (86th Session, Geneva 1998); C. Kaufmann, Globalisation
and Labour Rights (Oxford, Hart, 2007), pp. 67–77.
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labour, freedom of association, the right to organise and bargain collec-
tively, equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value
and non-discrimination in employment.
One of the most controversial issues in the trade and labour debate
is the effect of labour standards on terms of trade. As early as 1919,
the Preamble of the Constitution of the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO) stated that ‘the failure of any nation to adopt humane
conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations, which
desire to improve the conditions in their own countries’.48 Likewise, the
Havana Charter of 1948 mentioned that unfair labour conditions can
create difficulties in international trade and provided for cooperation
with the ILO.49 Yet, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was
established in 1995, it did not provide for a formal linkage of trade
and labour standards. The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work of 1998 confirmed the approach of the WTO in
Singapore holding that ‘labour standards should not be used for pro-
tectionist purposes’,50 thus securing the competitive advantage of the
developing countries. However, the Declaration did not address the
reverse situation where low labour standards are used to lower production
costs.
The recently adopted ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Glob-
alization of June 2008 balanced this statement by holding that the:
violation of fundamental principles and rights at work cannot be invoked
or otherwise used as a legitimate comparative advantage.51
This constitutes a fundamental shift in the trade and labour debate,
putting labour standards on the same level as trade and even calling on
other organisations to cooperate.52 In fact, with this statement, the ILO is
going back to the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944 where it had empha-
sised the need for mainstreaming labour rights into the work of financial
48 International Labour Organization, Part XIII (Labour) of the Treaty of Versailles of 28
June 1919, Section I.
49 Art. 7 of the Havana Charter, Final Act and related Documents, UNCTAD, Interim
Commission for the International Trade Organization, Havana, 1948, E/Conf.2/78.
50 Para. 5 of the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
51 Para. I. A. (iv) of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, ILO, Pro-
visional Record 13 A/B, International Labour Conference, 97th session (Geneva, Interna-
tional Labour Office, 2008).
52 See F. Humbert,TheChallenge ofChild Labour in International Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2009).
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and economic organisations.53 Thus, a ‘new’ form of social clause may be
back on the global agenda for the trade and labour debate, as is already the
case at the regional and bilateral levels.54 Accordingly, the new Declaration
calls upon the ILO to assist its Members to promote the ILO’s strategic
objectives within the framework of bilateral or multilateral agreements.55
In conclusion, the new ILO Declaration represents a building block in
the trade and labour debate because it not only refers to the rationale
of unfair competition for the trade and labour linkage but also high-
lights the potential for trade agreements to advance the objectives of the
ILO.
By invoking the most recent ILO Declaration, the draft decision fol-
lows the approach chosen by the Singapore Declaration in reaffirming
Members’ commitments.
VIII. . . . Noting that carefully drafted trade incentive regimes may
advance the cause of human rights
Carefully drafted social clauses in trade agreements such as the US and EU
Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSPs) or the US–Cambodia Textile
Agreement can advance the cause of human rights. Such clauses have
contributed towards improving the implementation of labour standards
and human rights in some countries.56 Therefore, they might be explored
as a model for multilateral agreements. Since the application of such
social clauses has shown that their unilateral adoption and application
carries the risk of being politically and economically arbitrary,57 criteria
53 Adopted at the 26th General Conference of the ILO in Philadelphia on 10 May 1944 as
Annex to the ILO Constitution, Art. II(d). See C. Kaufmann, Globalisation and Labour
Rights (Oxford, Hart, 2007), pp. 50–52.
54 See for example the partnership agreement between the members of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, and the European Community, signed in Cotonou
on 23 June 2000 – Protocols – Final Act – Declarations, OJ 2000 No. L 317/3; Agree-
ment between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, available at: www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade
Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset upload file250 5112.pdf (visited 14 April 2009).
55 Para. II. A. (iv) of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, ILO,
Provisional Record 13 A/B, International Labour Conference, 97th session (Geneva, Inter-
national Labour Office, 2008).
56 See F. Humbert,TheChallenge ofChild Labour in International Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2009), chapter 4; F. Humbert, ‘Do social clauses in generalized systems of preferences
advance the cause of women?’ (2008) NCCR Working Paper 2008/4.
57 See F. Humbert,TheChallenge ofChild Labour in International Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2009), chapter 4.
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for a multilateral framework for GSPs under the WTO agreements will
be suggested below.58
1. Lessons from the US GSP
Under GSPs, developed countries grant reduced or zero tariff rates to
selected products originating in developing countries. Under the Trade
Act of 1984, the US GSP was re-authorised and labour rights condition-
ality was introduced, requiring beneficiary countries to observe ‘interna-
tionally recognized worker rights’. An applicant country is ineligible if it
is not taking steps to implement a certain set of unilaterally determined
labour rights such as the right to association and collective bargaining,
the prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labour, a
minimum age for employment of children, acceptable conditions of work
with respect to wages, hours of work and occupational health and safety.59
A country is also ineligible if it has not complied with its commitments
to eliminate the worst forms of child labour.60 Generally, it would be
preferable to explicitly refer to the relevant ILO Conventions in order to
provide a clear applicable standard.
Under the national interest clause, the President may however deter-
mine that the economic interests of the US preclude a country from
being designated as a beneficiary.61 This opens the door for arbitrary
application and non-transparent criteria. Nevertheless, the reporting,
petition and review process of the US GSP has achieved good results
for the labour rights situation in some countries.62 Still, the application
of the social clause could be made more objective and effective through
a review mechanism overseen by trade and human rights experts at the
decision-making level, by introducing guidelines for the acceptance and
rejection of petitions and by mainstreaming it with regard to the inter-
national level, e.g. through subjection to a special multilateral appeal
mechanism.63
58 See III, 3, c. 59 19 United States C. Sec. 2462 (b)(2)(G).
60 19 United States C. Sec. 2462 (b)(2)(H). 61 19 United States C. Sec. 2462(b)(2).
62 See for example F. Humbert, The Challenge of Child Labour in International Law (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009), chapter 4; F. Humbert, ‘Do social clauses in generalized
systems of preferences advance the cause of women?’ (2008) NCCR Working Paper 2008/4.
63 While the WTO dispute settlement mechanism may already take on a complaint relating
to the GSPs, there should be a special appeal mechanism consisting of trade and human
rights experts and allowing for a timely and effective handling of disputes on GSPs. For a
more thorough analysis, see ibid.
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2. Lessons from the EU GSP including the case of Sri Lanka
The current EU GSP provides for general arrangements and, inter alia,
a special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good
governance that refers to several human rights treaties.64 Under the spe-
cial incentive arrangements, additional incentives are granted to benefi-
ciary countries if they have ratified and effectively implemented sixteen
human rights conventions and at least seven conventions from a choice
of conventions on the environment and governance principles.65 Under
its withdrawal procedure, the EU may withdraw the special incentive
arrangement if the beneficiary country ceases to implement human rights
or labour rights.66
A Sri Lankan case study has shown that if the granting and withdrawal
procedure is effectively implemented and cooperation with trade unions
and civil society groups takes place, the EU GSP can be a useful tool
for improving human rights performance, including the introduction of
administrative measures such as equal wage rates for men and women
or new guidelines for a broader application of trade union rights.67 In
particular, the EU should review the human rights situation before grant-
ing special preferences including in situ visits, should exert continued
pressure on a non-complying country, introduce an effective complaints
mechanism and closely cooperate with ILO and UN bodies as well as with
trade unions and civil society.68
IX. . . . that the World Trade Organization shall fully respect the
international law of human rights and support their full enjoyment
Those responsible for WTO policy should be aware of potential neg-
ative impacts of WTO law on human rights in their daily practice. In
this regard, sufficient policy space for Members to meet their human
64 Council Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 applying a scheme of generalized
tariff preferences, OJ 2005 L 169/1, extended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008
of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalized tariff preferences for the period from 1
January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and amending Regulation (EC) No. 557/97, (EC) No.
1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No. 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007, OJ
2008 L 211/1.
65 Art. 9(1) lit. a to e of Council Regulation (EC) 980/2005.
66 Art. 16(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005.
67 F. Humbert, ‘Do social clauses in generalized systems of preferences advance the cause of
women?’ (2008) NCCR Working Paper 2008/4, pp. 26–37.
68 Ibid., pp. 36–7.
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rights obligations69 as well as technical assistance and flanking measures
to support developing countries in complying with their human rights
obligations are essential. Such a mainstreaming approach requires coop-
eration with competent human rights bodies.
X. . . . that the protection of human dignity shall be a guiding
principle of the Organization
Human dignity as a guiding principle in resolving conflicts between
human rights and international trade law requires a ‘dimension of
weight’70 or ‘importance’71 to be attributed to it, e.g. in a conflict between
the prohibition of subsidies and assuring the right to food.
XI. . . . that a Multilateral Agreement on Trade and Human Rights is
to be negotiated, providing appropriate instruments to foster the cause
of mutually supportive regimes, institutional and legal coherence and
the full enjoyment of all human rights
We came to the conclusion that a full agreement, annexed to the Mar-
rakesh Agreement, and thus with a legal relevance equal to that of GATT,
GATS or TRIPS, is preferable to other possible regulatory forms, such as
a side-agreement, a political declaration, an authoritative interpretation
(Article IX:2 Marrakesh Agreement), or a plurilateral agreement with
phase-in provisions. As mentioned above, all WTO Members are bound
to specific human rights. Furthermore, the objective of sustainable devel-
opment requires a balance between human rights and trade. Establishing
appropriate legal instruments to coordinate both regimes is thus not
optional or a mere interpretative issue, but a genuine systemic task to be
performed. Given that human rights are a horizontal issue affecting the
whole body of WTO law and not a sub-category of international trade law
or conflict rules, they need to be enshrined at the same regulatory level as
the WTO Agreements.
69 C. Dommen, ‘Human rights and trade: Two practical suggestions for promoting coordi-
nation and coherence’, in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn and E. Bu¨rgi (eds.), Human Rights and
International Trade (Oxford University Press 2005), p. 199.
70 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977).
71 See for a ‘dimension of weight’ regarding values of ‘vital importance to the highest degree’,
Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 169–172.
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C. Fulfilling the task: elements of a multilateral agreement on
trade and human rights
As an instrument of effective coordination, a multilateral agreement on
trade and human rights has to provide procedures and mechanisms to
develop criteria and principles which address the intersection of trade
and human rights, not only with regard to dispute settlement but also
policies and decision-making procedures.
I. Policy coordination
An effective balance between trade and human rights regimes requires an
exploration of the potential positive and negative impacts of both fields
on each other and a search for appropriate means to prevent and counter
the negative effects. In line with the UNHCHR human rights approach
to trade,72 this calls for systematic impact assessments scanning existing
WTO law as well as future provisions on the agenda, including monitoring
and follow-up. Accordingly, adequate institutional devices, mechanisms,
procedures and criteria are needed, with inter-institutional cooperation
between the WTO and human rights institutions being a central condi-
tion. Avenues to be pursued include mutual observer status and exchange
of information, inter-institutional agreements,73 memoranda of under-
standing and common committees.74 A Committee on Trade and Human
Rights could be mandated to establish and monitor policies and to create
a cooperative link to other international bodies competent to deal with
human rights questions, such as the UNHCHR, the ILO75 the OECD,
UNESCO, the World Bank or the FAO.
For more information on trade and human rights, to be ‘fed’ into
impact assessment analysis and methodology, broadening the mandate of
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), to address not only trade
policy per se but also its impact on human rights, may be an avenue to
pursue. Such a mandate would enable a multilateral assessment of the
72 See note 43 above.
73 See J. Neumann, Die Koordination des WTO Rechts mit anderen vo¨lkerrechtlichen Ordnun-
gen (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2002).
74 See for an overview V. Mosoti, ‘Institutional cooperation and norms creation in inter-
national organizations’, in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn and E. Bu¨rgi (eds.), Human Rights and
International Trade (Oxford University Press, 2005).
75 See for the current state of WTO/ILO cooperation, www.wto.org/english/thewto e/
coher e/wto ilo e.htm (visited 14 April 2009).
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positive and negative effects that WTO norms may have on human rights
and policies.
The suggested assessment would correspond better to the WTO’s sus-
tainable development objective than the existing mechanism does.76 It
could build on current TPRM transparency obligations which already
comprise Members’ ‘wider economic and developmental needs, their
policies and objectives’.77
II. Dispute settlement
A multilateral framework on trade and human rights should clarify WTO
law interpretation with regard to human rights and provide for more
coherence and predictability. Existing rules of treaty interpretation (such
as the VCLT)78 require WTO dispute settlement bodies to consider human
rights obligations and to apply WTO law in conformity with existing
human rights obligations.79 This implies that WTO bodies should exercise
judicial restraint if human rights claims are based on measures that are
necessary to protect human rights and are thus applied on a good faith
basis and not in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.80 WTO bodies
have, in the light of Article 3.2 DSU and Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, recognised
that the WTO is embedded in the international legal system and that
provisions outside WTO law should clarify rights and obligations under
the WTO covered agreements.81 There is still dispute, however, over the
extent to which ‘relevant rules of international law’ should be ‘applicable
76 R. Howse and R. G. Teitel, ‘Beyond the divide. The Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the World Trade Organization’ (2007) 30Dialogue onGlobalization18,
available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04572.pdf . (visited 14 April 2009).
77 See TPRM Agreement, Annex 3, Trade Policy Review Mechanism, A. Objectives (ii).
78 Preamble, para. 6; Art. 31.
79 With regard to human rights obligations of international organisations, see the decision
by the European Court of Human Rights in Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramaty
v. France, Germany and Norway (dec.) [GC], Nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01, 2 May 2007.
80 See in terms of a human rights caveat for the national level, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the EuropeanUnion and Commission of the
European Communities, cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, [2008] ECR I-(nyr); K. Ziegler,
‘Strengthening the rule of law, but fragmenting international law: The Kadi decision
of the ECJ from the perspective of human rights (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review
288–305.
81 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 17; Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para.
130; Appellate Body, EC – Asbestos, para. 172; J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public
International Law: HowWTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge
University Press, 2003), pp. 443–472.
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in relation between the parties’.82 Here, three interpretations are possible:
first, only binding rules applicable between all member parties are to be
considered;83 second, only binding rules applicable between the parties
to the dispute are to be taken into account;84 and third, all relevant rules
‘in relation between the parties’ are to be applied, regardless of their
binding effects85 – or more restricted, if at least one party to the dispute is
bound.86 In 2003, the International Court of Justice convincingly argued
for a broader interpretation.87
The narrow interpretations could lead to a de facto priority of WTO
provisions and thereby hinder coherence and consistency with norms in
other areas of international law. Based on the principles of good faith
and pacta sunt servanda, states are simultaneously and equally bound
by their international law obligations. Except for ius cogens and obliga-
tions derived from the UN Charter, there is no priority of any specific
body of international law.88 As the Appellate Body stated, the WTO is
not a self-contained regime, therefore its provisions are not to be read
in ‘clinical isolation’ from public international law.89 The WTO system
is forming part of an international multilayered system of governance,90
82 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission (Koskenniemi Report), A/CN.4/L.682 (2006), para. 37; C. McLachlan, ‘The
principle of systemic integration and Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention’ (2005)
54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279–319; J. Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging frag-
mentation and unity: International law as a universe of inter-connected islands’ (2004)
25 Michigan Journal of International Law 913.
83 Panel Report, EC – Biotech, para. 7.68.
84 J. Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging fragmentation and unity: International law as a universe of inter-
connected islands’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 910; J. Pauwelyn,
‘Human rights in WTO dispute settlement’, in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn and E. Bu¨rgi (eds.),
Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 216.
85 R. Howse and R. G. Teitel, ‘Beyond the divide: The Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the World Trade Organization’ (2007) 30 Dialogue on Globalization
28–29, p. 39, available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04572.pdf . (visited 14
April 2009).
86 B. McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of international law or “systemic integration” of treaty
regimes: EC-Biotech products and the proper interpretation of Article 31 (3) (c) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (2008) 42 Journal of World Trade 594.
87 International Court of Justice Case, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States
of America) ICJ Reports 2003, p. 161.
88 European Court of Human Rights Matthews v. the United Kingdom, case No. 24833/94,
§ 28, ECHR 1999-I.
89 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 17.
90 T. Cottier, ‘Legitimacy of the WTO law’ (2008) NCCR Working Paper 2008/19, 8.
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which should be shaped in such a way as to allocate competencies appro-
priately and to coordinate ‘inter-connected islands’ of law.91 With regard
to coordinating overlapping regimes, legal standards of interpretation
and conflict resolution, providing guidelines for weighing and balanc-
ing rights and obligations (e.g. the ‘importance’ of values, or good faith
standards92), could clarify legitimate rights and obligations within the
broader context of international law. Developed systematically, in col-
laboration between relevant institutions, such standards could enhance
overall legitimacy of WTO law and foster coherence in international law.
Although real conflicting cases regarding human rights may be rare,93 it
is a matter of time until the WTO bodies are confronted with delicate
challenges to be resolved within the existing framework of WTO law.
The WTO waiver for the ‘Kimberley Process’ on the control of conflict
diamonds and the WTO dispute settlement rulings on conditional trade
preferences for developing countries point in this direction.94
The approach we propose here is procedural in nature, focusing on
cooperation between international standard-setting bodies and judi-
cial bodies, seeking competencies to provide expertise and establishing
decision-making mechanisms to find viable solutions.95 Such an approach
would, for instance, allow WTO bodies to be involved in cases with politi-
cal impact. Article 3(9) DSU and Article IX:2 WTO Agreement already
foresee recourse to the Ministerial Conference and the Council to issue
binding interpretations of WTO law. Yet, so far this mechanism has never
91 For the model of multilayered governance see the Introduction to this book; J. Pauwelyn,
‘Bridging fragmentation and unity: International law as a universe of inter-connected
islands’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 903–916.
92 Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 172; Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp,
paras. 158 et seq.
93 See G. Marceau, ‘WTO dispute settlement and human rights’ (2002) 13 European Journal
of International Law 758.
94 K. Nadakavukaren Schefer, ‘Stopping trade in conflict diamonds: Exploring the trade and
human rights interface with the WTO waiver for the Kimberley Process’, in T. Cottier, J.
Pauwelyn and E. Bu¨rgi (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford University
Press, 2005), p. 391.
95 See in this respect, Report (Sutherland Report) of the Consultative Board to the Director-
General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Chal-
lenges in the New Millennium (WTO, 2004). The Report does not tackle coordinative
challenges and effective coordination with other regimes, but concentrates on ‘old’ WTO
issues not facing further coordinative challenges and conflicts; see for critique Joost
Pauwelyn, ‘The Sutherland Report: A missed opportunity for genuine debate on trade,
globalization and reforming the WTO’ (2005) 8 Journal of International Economic Law
329.
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been applied. Making use of this mechanism, WTO Members could clar-
ify the meaning of WTO norms with regard to human rights in given
cases. The instrument could be further developed, e.g. by establishing
a quorum or procedures to allow for temporary violation, suspension
or direct amendment of WTO provisions in the case of conflicts with
human rights obligations. Other procedural instruments include system-
atic cooperation with international legal bodies in WTO arbitration, e.g.
the obligation to apply, or to actively take into account, the opinion of
UN treaty bodies or the ILO. In this context, hierarchy, or ‘dimensions of
weight’ in international law, as well as criteria to resolve conflicts of norms
could be explored on a more legitimate basis, e.g. by inter-institutional
cooperation. Another instrument could be to establish a burden of proof
favouring human rights, similar to cases under the WTO Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) where the
Appellate Body placed the burden of proof on the applicant,96 or expert
commissions in specific dispute settlement fields, as provided for in para-
graph 4 of the Annex to the GATS on Financial Services, or improve civil
society participation through greater transparency in decision-making,
e.g. by granting public access to WTO Committees under an appropriate
regime (Article V:2 Marrakesh Agreement), thus securing the functioning
and effectiveness of the political bodies.
D. Specific annex agreements – some examples
In order to foster mutual supportiveness of human rights and trade law
in specific fields, the multilateral framework should encourage the nego-
tiation of specific agreements. Such agreements can take the form of an
annex to a multilateral agreement on trade and human rights or to other
WTO agreements. Our research included the development of rules for
specific areas of potential conflicts between trade law and human rights.
I. Trade law and the right to food
Increased integration of international markets has raised concerns that
openness to agricultural trade may jeopardise food security in developing
96 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 97. G. Marceau and J. P. Trachtman,
‘The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. A map of the World Trade
Organization law of domestic regulation of goods’ (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 831.
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countries.97 However, empirical evidence does not confirm that engaging
in (international) agricultural trade is necessarily associated with high
levels of undernourishment.98 The impact of agricultural trade liberali-
sation on the right to food is mediated by many factors such as domestic
policy reform that enhances positive effects of trade and cushions negative
impacts.
From a right to food perspective, it is problematic that empirical studies
typically refer to aggregates and say little about the distributional effects
among and within countries.99 Even if trade reform is likely to reduce
poverty in the long run, economic theory recognises that some of the
poor may be worse off.100 Human Rights Impact Assessments (HRIAs) of
trade-related rules and policies that are being developed as part of the doc-
toral research conducted in our project constitute an instrument to ensure
coherence between human rights and international trade law obliga-
tions by identifying those complementary measures that may be required
by human rights law to address adverse consequences of international
trade.
Human rights law provides a conceptual framework for analysing trade
rules and undertaking impact assessments, the latter implying that they
should be public and participatory and focus on disadvantaged and vul-
nerable groups as well as gender effects of trade rules. It is important
from both a legal and a political point of view that Human Rights Impact
Assessments do not mean or imply conditionalities, monitoring or mea-
suring human rights performance of states in any way that they have not
agreed to. In particular, HRIAs are aimed to:
 help people identify and assess their rights;
 understand how trade reform can affect the enjoyment of those rights;
 identify ways in which governments can improve trade policies to fulfil
human rights obligations; and
97 See B. Karapinar and C. Ha¨berli (eds.), Food Crises and the WTO (Cambridge University
Press, 2010).
98 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, ‘The state of food and
agriculture 2005: Agricultural trade and poverty – can trade work for the poor?’ (2005)
36 FAO Agriculture Series 82–84.
99 C. Kaufmann and S. Heri, ‘Liberalizing trade in agriculture and food security: Mission
impossible?’ (2008) 40 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1041–1042.
100 S. Matusz and D. Tarr, ‘Adjusting to trade policy reform’, in A. O. Krueger (ed.), Economic
Policy Reform: The Second Stage (University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 389.
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 identify ways in which governments can cooperate with the interna-
tional community to fulfil human rights obligations.101
box 8.2 policy advice on trade liberalisation
and the right to food
Draft guiding principles on Trade and the Right to Food
 With regard to the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the
Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Process on Least-Developed and Net
Food-Importing Developing Countries102 further efforts must be undertaken to
operationalise the response mechanisms listed in the Decision: (1) food aid, (2)
short-term financing of normal levels of commercial imports, (3) favourable terms
for agricultural export credits, and (4) financial assistance to improve agricultural
productivity and infrastructure. A Ministerial commitment in the Doha Final Act
to update and implement the Marrakesh Decision would be a first step in this
regard.
 Efforts to reach a compromise between policy space and market access on Special
Products and on the Special Safeguard Mechanism should be strengthened. The
Agreement on Agriculture’s preamble stipulates that ‘commitments under the
reform programme should be made in an equitable way among all Members,
having regard to non-trade concerns, including food security [ . . . ]’. The draft
modalities’ illustrative list of indicators for the designation of special products
currently being discussed points in this direction.103
 In line with the long-term objective in the preamble of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture ‘to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system’,
important issues such as biofuels and disciplines for export restrictions should be
addressed in future negotiations.
 Recalling the preambular paragraph of the Marrakesh Agreement that ‘there
is a need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in interna-
tional trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development’, more
efforts in the agricultural field are necessary. The Enhanced Integrated Frame-
work should increasingly be used to build productive agricultural sectors. The
evaluation criteria for the success of Aid for Trade should not only be growth in
101 S. Walker, ‘Human rights impact assessments of trade-related policies’, in M. W. Gehring
and M.-C. Cordonier Segger (eds.), Sustainable Development in World Trade Law (The
Hague, Kluwer, 2005), p. 227.
102 15 April 1994.
103 Draft Modalities for Agriculture, Doc. TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 (6 December 2008), paras.
129–131, Annex F.
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trade volumes but the impact of Aid for Trade on poverty reduction, the Human
Development Index, and its contribution to the Millennium Development Goals.
 A feasibility study on whether a violation or a threat thereof by a WTO Member
to respect, protect, and fulfil the right to food could serve as a criterion for
different forms of special and differential treatment shall be undertaken. Causality
involving a genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect between the
violation of the right to adequate food or the threat thereof, and the trade rule
for which special and differential treatment is sought will be a necessary element.
Whether there is a violation by a WTO Member of their obligation to respect,
protect and fulfil the right to food will be determined by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The WTO Secretariat will cooperate in this
endeavour with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Food and the Advisory Committee
of the Human Rights Council.
 Following the missions to the WTO of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right
to health in 2004104 and the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate
food in 2008, a standing invitation of the WTO Membership to Missions of UN
Special Rapporteurs should be considered to enable such exchanges to become
more common.
 Members should be encouraged to report on food security-related trade policies in
their trade policy review by e.g. structuring the food security-related trade policy
review along the trade-relevant guidelines of the FAO Voluntary Guidelines to
Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context
of National Food Security. Usage of the Voluntary Guidelines in the TPRM shall
not be construed as recognising any change in the current state of conventional
or customary international law regarding rights related to food.
 Aid for Trade and Food Aid Commitments shall become binding by inclusion in
Members’ schedules.
II. Trade in services and human rights
A specific Annex to the GATS on trade-related aspects of human rights
and essential services could underline the need for human rights impact
assessment in the services sector. WTO rules can only provide regulatory
space for WTO Members to protect human rights; concrete regulation or
flanking measures for protecting affected people remain the responsibility
of the individual Member. Regarding the WTO’s specific commitment to
104 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Mission to the World Trade
Organization, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/49/Add. 1 (1 March 2004), para. 2.
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developing countries, the WTO could assist as a consultative body in the
technical design of flanking measures or cooperation with development
institutions (World Bank, foreign technical assistance) in the countries
concerned. Institutionally, establishing a specialised Coordinating Com-
mittee in the WTO could facilitate cooperation.
III. Corruption, trade and human rights
The rationale for a specific Agreement or Protocol on Corruption annexed
to a multilateral agreement on trade and human rights begins with the
significance of corruption in individuals’ enjoyment of their fundamental
rights. It is underlined by the impacts of corruption on trade liberalisation
that distort the human rights of traders and citizens.
1. The relationship between corruption and human rights
The links between corruption and human rights are the focus of signifi-
cant research efforts.105 While looking at corruption’s impacts on specific
human rights can illuminate the severe violations of human rights protec-
tion, analysis of how corruption affects the willingness or ability of a state
to respect, protect, and promote such rights is more apparent by an exam-
ination of three aspects of human rights obligations on the state: duties of
non-interference, substantive duties to act, and procedural duties of the
administrative and court systems. To these three aspects a discussion of
corruption’s effects on the right to democratic participation as a right that
is especially put at risk by corrupt state structures can be added. In the area
of duties of non-interference, corruption can have the result of spurring
violations in order to benefit the official who authorises the interference.
Here, actions to block political opposition, whether through restraints on
speech, press, or gatherings, can arise from corrupt political systems or
be maintained by power-holders who keep their control through illicit
transactions.
Where substantive duties to act are necessary to comply with a state’s
human rights obligations, such as in the provision of social and eco-
nomic goods, corruption’s impacts are even clearer. Losses of state
moneys through embezzlement or nepotism-driven overpayment on
105 E.g. J. Bacio-Terracino, Corruption as a Violation of Human Rights (2008) http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1107918 (visited 14 April 2009); B. Rajagopal, ‘Corruption, legitimacy
and human rights: The dialectic of the relationship’ (1999) 14 Connecticut Journal of
International Law 495.
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contracts or corruption-induced laxness in enforcing quality controls
reduces the state’s ability to provide citizens with access to health, educa-
tion, and food, and can endanger the lives of labourers and consumers of
state-built infrastructure. Procedure-based human rights can be negated
by corruption as principles of non-discrimination and fair treatment are
ignored in favour of self-interest. Judicial corruption, too, puts individ-
ual’s rights to be presumed innocent, to be judged in accordance with
the law, and subject to proportionate sanctions in competition with the
court’s personal interests.
Despite the severity of corruption’s infringements of the above-
mentioned human rights, the systemic nullification of rights to demo-
cratic participation necessarily arising from any significant level of cor-
ruption in a state may be the most damaging effect of corruption in the
long term.106 Extreme corruption, such as existed in states like Indone-
sia under the leadership of Suharto, can effectively blend the personal
interests of the leader with the public interest. Even moderate levels of
corruption, however, damage democracies. When state officials, whether
bureaucrats, legislators, or leaders, act in their own personal interest,
rather than that of the state and its population, the electorate is effectively
denied its right to participate in the governance.
2. Corruption’s effects on trade
Evidence offered by empirical studies shows how trade is affected by (and
affects) levels and types of corruption.107 The review and analysis of such
studies for their human rights implications makes clear that – using the
framework set out above – those general effects of corruption on human
rights have specific parallels within the trade administration, in particu-
lar where the state has procedural duties (in the administrative and court
106 The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal
access to public service is anchored in Article 25 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see General Comment No. 25, avail-
able at www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/d0b7f023e8d6d9898025651e004bc0eb?
Opendocument (visited 5 August 2009).
107 See, e.g., S. Bandyopadhyay and S. Roy, ‘Corruption and trade protection: Evidence
from panel data’ (2007) Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 022A (available at:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2007/2007-022.pdf); R. Damania, P. G. Fredriksson,
J. A. List, ‘Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: Theory
and evidence’ (2003) 46 Journal of Environmental Economics & Management 490–512;
H. Sung, ‘Between demand and supply: Bribery in international trade’ (2006) 44 Crime,
Law & Social Change 111.
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 130.60.248.196 on Thu Jul 10 10:48:38 BST 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511792496.010
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014
350 barnali choudhury et al.
systems) and where trade liberalisation requires the approval of the citi-
zenry to be legitimate.108 In even the simplest case of corruption in the
trading system, for instance bribery of an official for an import licence,
the corruption itself can violate the trader’s right to fair and non-arbitrary
administrative procedures. Other cases of corruption, where govern-
ment procurement contracts are granted to relatives of an official despite
a lower quality or higher cost end-product than other bidders could
have delivered, for example, may have even more serious human rights
implications – such as violating citizens’ rights to health if the contract
was to supply medicines to the national healthcare system. And, as stated
above, corruption’s frequent violation of the right to democratic partic-
ipation can have clear impacts on the legitimacy of trade liberalisation.
Where legislated openings of markets are passed due to illicit influences
on law-makers by foreign industry, the citizens are denied their voice
in government. The liberalisations are therefore equally illegitimate –
procedurally, even if not always substantively.
3. Corruption’s effects on the trade and human
rights relationship
Finally, a WTO text on corruption, trade and human rights is necessi-
tated by the fact that corruption has an influence on whether or how
trade liberalisation could be affecting human rights. That is, corruption
impacts areas where there are ‘trade and human rights’ problems, at times
making the liberalisation of such areas more threatening to human rights
(such as when corrupted legislators pass laws that allow highly efficient
foreign competitors to enter a market previously dominated by small-
scale producers who lived at the margins of existence and who now face
serious violations of their economic rights to work, shelter, food and
health; or when the access of foreign service providers of education to
a market results in a factual division of the school system into public
schools and private schools, with the poor forced to attend increasingly
under-resourced institutions while the wealthy attend private schools)
and at other times making the non-liberalisation of certain areas threat-
ening to human rights (if corrupt officials with an interest in maintaining
a monopoly market refuse to permit competition in a food staple, for
example, poor urban dwellers may be denied access to sufficient nutri-
tion). It is even possible that corruption has prevented some negative
108 See K. Nadakavukaren Schefer, ‘Corruption and human rights’ (2009) 43 Journal of
World Trade 737–770.
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changes to the level of particular human rights enjoyed by some while
nevertheless failing to support an overall system of human rights protec-
tion (when, for instance, a particular export industry is sheltered from
foreign competition due to the monetary benefits from such protection
going to the law-maker, the employees are ensured further work, but
suffer in their rights to an answerable government).
box 8.3 draft agreement on corruption, trade, and
human rights
Members,
 Acknowledging the impact of corruption on all governments and at every level of
administration;
 Recognising the multiple opportunities for corruption in trade regulation
provided by the high volume of transactions and the economic value of these
transactions;
 Stressing the need to continually strive to develop new methods to counter
corruption;
 Deploring the massive misallocation of public resources (financial, personnel)
that corruption causes;
 Concerned about the grave consequences of corruption on the willingness and
ability of a state to fulfil its human rights obligation, and in particular about the
inevitable demise of effective rights of democratic participation that accompanies
corruption;
 Determined to address corruption in trade administrations as a human rights
problem,
Hereby agree as follows:
Article 1 – Coverage
This Agreement applies to Members’ efforts to address corruption as it relates to
trade and human rights;
Article 2 – Definition of Corruption
For purposes of this Agreement, corruption shall include any acts or omissions by a
public official of a Member to give an illegitimate benefit or to refrain from issuing
a punishment or disadvantage to another individual in exchange for something of
value to that official.
Article 3 – Minimum Standard of Corruption-Control Efforts
1. Members shall comply with the United Nations Convention against Corruption.
2. A Member may require higher standards of corruption control, should it consider
it feasible to do so.
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Article 4 – Transparency
1. Members shall ensure the transparency of their trade administrative procedures,
in particular by:
a) ensuring that decision-making is reasoned and made available to affected
traders, and
b) providing judicial review of administrative decisions by independent judges.
2. Members shall make detailed public accounts open and available to interested
persons.
Article 5 – Non-Discrimination
Members shall perform their corruption control activities within a framework of
non-discrimination as set forth by Articles I and III GATT 1994 and Articles 3 and
4 TRIPS.
Article 6 – Dispute Settlement
1. The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994, as elaborated and
applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations
and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement.
2. Members shall refrain from using corruption charges as an instrument of nego-
tiating pressure.
Article 7 – Developing and Least-Developed Country Members
1. Members shall accept a commitment to extend financial support to developing
and least-developed Members in their efforts to reduce public corruption.
2. Members shall accept a commitment to extend technical support to developing
and least-developed Members in their efforts to reduce public corruption.
Article 8 – Committee on Corruption
1. A Committee on Corruption will be established that will act as a point of enquiry
as well as a provider of technical assistance and international cooperation with
other intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations.
2. Committee members will meet not less than twice a year and otherwise at the
request of any Member.
3. The Committee’s function will include the furthering of research on the topic of
this Agreement.
IV. Trade incentive regimes for human rights
Carefully drafted social clauses in trade incentive regimes such as GSPs
may not only foster human rights but also contribute to achieving coher-
ence between human rights and international trade law.
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1. The status quo of GSPs under WTO law
Under the status quo, GSPs are compatible with WTO law if they meet
the criteria of the Enabling Clause.109 According to the Appellate Body,
schemes that provide for objective criteria and are available to all similarly
situated developing countries with the same developing needs meet these
conditions.110 Examples of such objective criteria include international
human rights protected under UN and ILO Conventions as mentioned
in the EU GSP. By contrast, interest clauses such as those used by the US
are unlikely to meet the standards established by the Appellate Body.111
Thus, future social clauses should be framed along the lines of the EU
GSP taking into account the recommendations made above.
2. Developing criteria for GSPs under a
multilateral framework
Criteria for future social clauses in trade incentives should be incorporated
into the WTO Agreement building upon the criteria of the Enabling
Clause. From a substantial point of view they should be drafted along the
following guiding principles:
 They should provide for cooperation with UN and ILO bodies.
 The relevant standards should be the ILO and UN human rights
conventions.
 The procedures for granting and withdrawing tariff preferences should
include human rights assessments, in situ visits by trade and human
rights experts, ideally in cooperation with civil society and trade unions,
and should provide detailed application guidelines ensuring effective
monitoring and should set out the consequences in case of non-
compliance with human rights.112
The decisions on granting and withdrawing should be made subject
to an effective review mechanism. Such a review mechanism should in
109 GATT Contracting Parties, Decision of 28 November 1979, ‘Differential and More
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries’,
BISD 26/203 (1980).
110 Cf. Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences.
111 F. Humbert, ‘Do social clauses in generalized systems of preferences advance the cause
of women?’ (2008) NCCR Working Paper 2008/4, 45.
112 See also the Draft Proposal for a 2008 ILA Resolution on ‘International trade law and
human rights’ in International Law Association, Rio Conference (2008), International
Trade Law, pp. 15–17, which submits that respect for human rights increases civil society
support for the WTO.
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turn be subjected to a special appeal mechanism under the WTO, open
for WTO Members.
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